Recent developments in neural language models (LMs) have raised concerns about their potential misuse for automatically spreading misinformation. In light of these concerns, several studies have proposed to detect machine-generated fake news by capturing their stylistic differences from human-written text. These approaches, broadly termed stylometry, have found success in source attribution and misinformation detection in human-written texts. However, in this work, we show that stylometry is limited against machine-generated misinformation. While humans speak differently when trying to deceive, LMs generate stylistically consistent text, regardless of underlying motive. Thus, though stylometry can successfully prevent impersonation by identifying text provenance, it fails to distinguish legitimate LM applications from those that introduce false information. We create two benchmarks demonstrating the stylistic similarity between malicious and legitimate uses of LMs, employed in auto-completion and editing-assistance settings. 1 Our findings highlight the need for non-stylometry approaches in detecting machinegenerated misinformation, and open up the discussion on the desired evaluation benchmarks.
The use of statistical methods for analyzing human-written documents has been studied extensively since the early days of the field. One common application is provenance detection. For example, Mosteller and Wallace (1963) used word counts to predict the authorship of historical documents. Tweedie, Singh, and Holmes (1996) extracted other stylistic features and applied a neural network to the same task. While these classifiers could be fooled by an aware writer that intentionally imitates other's style , this approach was found useful for de-anonymizing cybercriminals in forums (Afroz et al. 2014) , identifying programmers (Caliskan-Islam et al. 2015) and more (Neal et al. 2017) . In a related line of study, stylometry was applied to, rather than detecting the specific person, identifying characteristics of the author, such as age and gender (Goswami, Sarkar, and Rustagi 2009), political views (Potthast et al. 2018) , or IQ (Abramov and Yampolskiy 2019) . Recently, as detailed later below, stylometry was used to distinguish machine-from human-writers.
Another common application of stylometry is detecting human-written misinformation. Mihalcea and Strapparava (2009) found specific words that are highly correlated with true and false statements. Ott et al. (2011); Feng, Banerjee, and Choi (2012) used a richer set of features such as POS tags frequencies and constituency structure to deceptive writing. Following these observations and the increasing interest in fake news, recent studies applied stylometry on entire news articles (Pisarevskaya 2017 ), short news reports (Pérez-Rosas et al. 2018) , fact and political statements (Nakashole and Mitchell 2014; Rashkin et al. 2017 ) and posts in social media ). The success of these studies is mostly attributed to stylistic changes in human language when lying or deceiving (Bond and Lee 2005; Frank, Menasco, and O'Sullivan 2008) . In this work, we evaluate the viability of this approach on machine-generated text, where stylistic differences between truth and lie might be more subtle.
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Machine-generated Text Detection. Detecting text's provenance is similar to authorship attribution and, therefore, stylometry can be effective. Indeed, Gehrmann, Strobelt, and Rush (2019) show the existence of distributional differences between human-written texts and machine-generated ones by visualizing the per-token probability according to a LM. Bakhtin et al. (2019) learn a dedicated provenance neural classifier. While their classifier achieves high in-domain accuracy, they find that it overfits the generated text distribution rather than detecting outliers from human texts, resulting in increased "human-ness" scores for random perturbations. Nevertheless, an advantage of such neural approaches over more traditional stylometry methods is that, given enough data, the model learns hidden stylistic representations without the need to manually define any features.
Building on the above observation, Zellers et al. (2019) focus on fake news and create a Transformer-based LM (Vaswani et al. 2017) dubbed Grover and train it on a large news corpus. Grover also includes a "neural fake news detector", a linear classifier on top of the hidden state of the last token of the examined article, fine-tuned to classify if the news text was machine-generated or not. The experiments in this paper are based on the Grover-Mega classifier, fine-tuned for the target task (see section 3).
Fake News Detection Approaches Beyond Stylometry. The other most extensively studied NLP-based approach for fake news detection is based on fact-checking. This approach have recently gained increasing attention thanks to several synthetic (Thorne et al. 2018) and real-world datasets (Hanselowski et al. 2018; Popat et al. 2018; Augenstein et al. 2019) . The performance of current models is still far from humans (Thorne et al. 2019; Schuster et al. 2019 ), but with their advancements they can still play a positive role in detection.
Another line of work for fake news detection utilizes non-textual information such as how content is propagated, by which users, its originating URL, and other metadata (Castillo, Mendoza, and Poblete 2011; Gupta et al. 2014; Zhao, Resnick, and Mei 2015; Kochkina, Liakata, and Zubiaga 2018; Liu and Wu 2018) , as well as incorporating users' explicit feedback, such as abuse reporting (Tschiatschek et al. 2018) . Social network platforms, ISPs, and even individual users can employ such methods to moderate content exposure. These approaches are beset by the challenges (Shu et al. 2017 ) of noisy and incomplete data, especially given the need to detect fake news early (Liu and Wu 2018) (before propagation and user engagement patterns are fully formed).
Adversarial Setting
"Fake News": Our Working Definition. Our attackers focus on automatically introducing false information into otherwise trustworthy content. We call the resultant manipulated articles "fake news". This definition matches the one of Zhou and Zafarani (2018) and is in line with the disinformation focused view of Wardle and Derakhshan (2017) . Also, this is in line with how false claims are represented in many human-generated fake news datasets Augenstein et al. 2019) . Conversely, Zellers et al. (2019) focus on entirely fabricated articles, a different type of fake news where the goal is mostly to create "viral and persuasive" content.
Our choice of creating articles with only a limited number of false statements is aligned with the way humans tend to deceive or lie. Psychological studies (Mazar, Amir, and Ariely 2008) support the age-old notion that, when lying, "the best policy for the criminal is to tell the truth as nearly as possible" [Raskolnikov, "Crime and Punishment" (Dostoyevsky 1866) ]. This helps preserve an honest self-image and, perhaps more importantly, reduces the chances of the lie being detected. For example, a study on the longest-surviving known fake Wikipedia article (Benjakob 2019; Hox) revealed that many of the presented facts were only slightly altered from other, true facts. Geun-hye will be asked how she is planning to confront North Korea and whether her country needs to deploy its ground troops. It also is unlikely that she will deploy U.S. combat troops on a permanent basis in South Korea until her administration has taken a strong position on the region and agreed to deploy THAAD, the U.S. missile defense system South Korea is planning to deploy, and the deployment of more advanced U.S. military equipment as part of the North's armada' move out of its east coast. Mr. Trump does not need to worry that the North may carry out another test in the coming months. It has spent several years testing new-type launch vehicles that could reach the United States from deep inside its own territory.
Title: Fernandez defends Argentine grain export tax President Cristina Fernandez on Tuesday defended an increase in export taxes on grains that has riled many farmers, and she called on them to respect the law in protesting her policies. <…> In a concession to her critics, Fernandez said the increase in taxes on exports of grains that she instituted in March by decree will be debated by Congress. But there is little likelihood that the Congress will order major changes, since her party controls both houses. But Hilda Duhalde, an opponent of Fernandez, was not persuaded. "It's true that they have a majority in both houses, but we have to put white on black and watch out for the small-and medium-sized producers, who are the ones suffering," she said. Argentina raised export taxes in March by more than 10 percent. Fernandez has said growers have benefited from rising world prices and the profits should be spread to help the poor. Farmers have countered that they need to reinvest the profits and that the higher taxes make it difficult for them to make a living. Fernandez said she was open to dialogue, but a dialogue that does not countenance the blocking of roads or other disruptions to the lives of Argentines. "Democracy for the people, not the corporations," she said.
We attempt to answer: Who appealed for dialogue and respect? Attack and Defense Capabilities. We adopt an adversarial setting similar to that of Zellers et al. (2019) . Our attacker wishes to generate fake text, that contains unverified or false claims, en masse, using a language model to automate the process. The attacker's goal is to produce fake text that the verifier classifies as real. Our verifier is adaptive: it receives a limited set of examples generated by the attacker, and trains a discriminator to detect the attacker's texts from legitimately-produced, real text, containing exclusively humanverified claims (news articles from relatively reputable sources, like the The New York
Times are assumed to be real). We also experiment with a non-adaptive, zero-shot setting, where the verifier does not receive the attacker's examples.
Training and evaluating the detector. In each experiment, we collected a dataset with a "real" text class and a "fake" text class and used separate samples for testing and for fine-tuning. We used a Grover-Mega discriminator for all of the experiments. The model's weights were initialized from a checkpoint provided by Zellers et al. (2019) and fine-tuned for 10 epochs with our training samples. For evaluating the zero-shot defense, we applied a pretrained Grover-Mega discriminator by querying its Web interface. We report human performance on some of the attacks.
Stylometry Fails to Detect Machine-Generated Misinformation
We create two datasets, simulating two different uses of LMs to automatically produce fake news. In the first, the extension scenario, an auto-completion text generator extends a news article. A responsible user of this generator verifies the correctness of the output (producing real text), whereas an attacker verifies incorrectness (producing fake text).
In the second, the modification scenario, the attacker uses a human-written news article and performs subtle modifications to semantically modify statements. Specifically, we add and remove negations. This follows the intuition that, if we take care to add Additionally, we used about 100 examples from each dataset to test human performance in detecting this form of misinformation. For the extension scenario, we assigned two subject volunteers with two different tasks. The first had the same task as Grover's detector, and the second was allowed to use external sources to verify facts (which Grover cannot do). For the modification scenario, the participants had the same task as Grover but we highlighted negations to help them focus on the relevant parts. (1) Creating the Extension Dataset. We use the newsQA dataset (Trischler et al. 2017) that contains Cable News Network (CNN) articles with corresponding questions and answers (segments copied verbatim from the text). Following Radford et al. (2019) and
von Davier (2019), we embed the question in a template that is appended to the end of the input text:
We attempt to answer: <question> Answer:
Then, the first sentence produced by Grover's generator is used as a potential answer.
We choose this template by examining common formats of questions in news articles and finding the one that empirically produces mostly reasonable answers by Grover's generator. For example, given text about a suspect caught in Washington D.C., and the question "Where was the suspect stopped?", Grover answered "2 blocks from the U.S. Capitol."
We manually labeled the generated answers. We filtered out nonsensical ones (29%) and labeled the rest as real or fake texts by correctness. Answers containing at least one false statement (judging by the article and/or external knowledge) were labeled fake.
We measured inter-annotator agreement on a subset of 100 examples labeled by two different annotators, and found it to be substantial (Cohen's kappa score of k = 0.78).
Finally, we remove the sentence containing the answer from each article by removing the sentence with the highest TF-IDF-weighted word-count similarity with the question and answer (concatenated).
(2) Creating the Modifications Dataset. We use articles from The New York Times (Thompson 2017) . We perform the modifications by removing and adding negations from statements:
first, we randomly delete m/2 "not" or "no" occurrences from the text. Then, we automatically find statements to add m/2 negations to, using the probabilities of a 9 2020 Association for Computational Linguistics Published under a Creative Commons Table 1 : Results: Section 4. We report (macro) F1 score and overall accuracy, as well as precision and recall of the "fake" class. Zero-shot performance (not included) was very low in all cases.
GPT-2 Medium language model. We randomly sample 100 locations in the article and choose the ones with the maximal score, defined as the probability for either "not" or "no", multiplied by the probability for the word following the negation. By both adding and removing, we keep the total number of negations unchanged, avoiding anomalous negations counts. Original NYT articles are labeled as real and modified ones as fake.
Results
The detector's performance figures are given in Table 1 . Against QA extension, the detector reached 71% accuracy in distinguishing true vs. false extensions generated by Grover. While this is above a trivial majority baseline (51%), some of the success could be a side effect of the way that the dataset was constructed. Labeling instances with at least one false statement as fake makes these sentences generally longer, allowing a simple linear classifier that only uses the extension's length to reach 56%. When evaluated only on the short false answers (up to 10 words), the accuracy drops from 71% to only 62%.
Ultimately, however, despite performing better than simple baselines, the detection in this setting is much worse than in distinguishing human from machine text (Section 5).
Comparing this with the results of the human evaluation is particularly instructive:
the first subject, given the same task as the detector, attained an F1 score of 0.68, only marginally below the detector. The second participant, who was allowed to use external sources, attained an F1 of 0.84. We conclude that the stylometry-based classifier doesn't perform much better than humans in detecting potential misinformation, and that verifying against other resources can drastically improve results. Table 2 : Detection results on the attacks of Section 5 in a zero-shot setting and the adaptive setting (where the discriminator is fine-tuned to a specific attacker). We report (macro) F1 score and overall accuracy. Precision, and recall of the "fake" class are reported as well.
For the automatic article modification attack, the classifier fails completely to detect two modifications (m = 2), and is not much better even when m = 10 statements are inverted. Even though the change includes negations that might introduce surprising factual claims, the language style remains too similar to detect it. Humans, evaluated with m = 2, had an F1 of 0.74, with 0.91 and 0.59 recall for real and modified articles, respectively. Thus, while humans perform better than the model, many of the modified statements were interpreted as real. Manually examining these, we found that the added negation actually changed the meaning in 60% of the instances that were misclassified.
Overall, the results show that both attacks can produce articles containing misinformation that evade the stylometry detector and mislead humans.
Stylometry Detects Machine-Human Impersonations
One might suspect that the low performance in Section 4 is due to limited capacity of our detector or the small fraction of generated text. We now show that the detector performs well on the provenance task and is sensitive to differences in small text portions.
(1) Fully-generated Articles. We perform a first evaluation of Grover against texts generated by a different model of similar size, namely GPT-2 XL (Radford et al. 2019 (2) Automatic Article Extension (Vanilla). In order to experiment with mixed humanmachine articles, we build an attacker that automatically extends unfinished humanwritten articles. We simulate this attacker by querying a GPT-2 Medium model, conditioned on the the first 500 words from an article. We include New York Times articles, truncated to match the length of the fake class, labeled as real text, and articles that were automatically extended, labeled fake text. We use different percentages (g) of machinegenerated text, by stopping the generation after an appropriate number of sentences.
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(3) Automatic QA-based Extension. In this experiment, we test whether the QA defense from Section 4 can perform better if we can assume that true texts are always humanwritten. To this end, we repeat the same setting but use the gold answers from the newsQA dataset for the "real text" class.
Results
Zero-shot Setting. As Table 2 shows, the zero-shot classifier is effective in detecting the fully generated articles of a different model, with a 0.9 F-1 score. The extended articles, containing a substantial amount of human-written text, are mostly classified as humanwritten in this setting. This is unsurprising considering the dataset of full articles the detector was originally trained on.
Adaptive Setting. After fine-tuning, Grover improves on the full articles and performs well against article extension generations, reaching 0.94 F1 score for articles with a single generated sentence (g = 1%). This stylometry detector is thus highly effective in distinguishing human from machine. texts are very similar in style to LM-generated texts containing true content. As a result, stylometry-based classifiers cannot identify auto-generated intentionally misleading content.
We conclude with the following recommendations:
(1) Extending Veracity-based Benchmarks. In order to better evaluate detectors against LM-generated misinformation, we recommend extending our benchmarks by creating other veracity-oriented datasets, that represent a wide range of LM applications, from whole-article generation to forms of hybrid writing and editing. (2) Improving Non-stylometry Methods. Other detection approaches, as surveyed at the end of Section 2, are less affected by the use of LMs. Therefore, advancements in such methods can improve the detection of both human-and machine-generated misinformation. Notably, the fact-checking setting makes fewer assumptions on the available auxiliary information and can be applied even if the text was sent to the verifier through a private channel such as E-mail. However, since fact-checking requires advanced inference capabilities, incorporating non-textual information, when available, can yield better results.
Conclusion. The potential use of LMs in creating fake news calls for a re-evaluation of current defense strategies. We examine the state-of-the-art stylometry model, and find it effective in preventing impersonation, but limited in detecting LM-generated misinformation. This new kind of misinformation could be created by the same model that is used by legitimate writers as a writing-assistance tool, hiding stylistic differences between falsified and truthful content. This motivates (1) constructing more instructive benchmarks for NLP-based approaches and improving non-stylistic methods, and (2) addressing a set of challenges that spans many disciplines beyond NLP, including social networks, information security, human-computer interaction, and others.
